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The distinction between science and the arts is usually regarded as significant. Not only do they deal with ontologically distinct objects, but the ways they come to terms with these objects are very different. In philosophy of science there has been a focus on explanation, in contrast to interpretation, because providing explanation was thought to be a key issue in the natural sciences. Since Carl Hempel’s seminal works on explanation, the world of philosophy has seen a growing body of literature devoted to explanation. The results have been prolific, and may, I think, be divided into basically three different approaches: 1) the formal-logical view, 2) the ontological view, and 3) the pragmatic view, all of which have important proponents. Elsewhere I have argue in favour of a pragmatic-rhetorical theory of explanation, and it is in light of this theory that I suggest we can understand interpretation in the natural sciences.
Although philosophers of science refer to both scientists’ understanding and the interpretation of data, measurements, and theories in their accounts of the natural sciences, they make little attempt to develop philosophical theories of understanding and interpretation to grasp this side of the formation of scientific knowledge. This is undoubtedly due to the old, but long standing, positivistic distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. The context of discovery, where interpretation is thought to belong, is regarded as part of psychology, whereas the context of justification, including explanation, is seen as an object to which logical and philosophical methods apply. After Thomas S. Kuhn, modern philosophers of science tend to be more sceptical about the possibility of drawing such a sharp distinction, but nobody seems to have explored the full consequences of this scepticism, realizing that explanation and interpretation are interdependent notions and therefore should be included in a systematic study of how we reach understanding in science.
In the present paper it will be argued that the natural sciences involve interpretation as much as the human sciences. I distinguish between two notions of interpretation which are rarely set apart. One is concerned with the question what X represents; the other deals with the question of how to represent Y.
 In the first sense an interpretation may be regarded as a tentative explanation by which one explains a representational problem. Such a problem arises in contexts where a phenomenon X is considered to represent something else but where there are doubts about what the phenomenon really stands for; it may be in connection with the consideration of physical phenomena, data, evidence, signs, formalisms or symbols, and texts or actions. The second sense of interpretation sees it as presenting a suggestion of how to represent a phenomenon Y. In support of such an analysis, I shall make use of a pragmatic-rhetorical theory of explanation to gain a better grasp of interpretation inside as well as outside science.

Explanation
To begin, let me briefly recall what I take explanation to be.​[1]​  In contrast to the logical-formal approach of explanation, the pragmatic approach denies that the concept of explanation can be characterised solely in semantic or syntactic terms. And contrary to the ontological approach, it refuses that explanation is only concerned with ontological categories like causation. The pragmatic approach regards explanation to be an appropriate answer to an explanation-seeking question in relation to a particular context. A question is being raised in a situation where the questioner has a cognitive problem because he or she lacks knowledge of some form and now hopes to be informed by an explanatory answer. Therefore, the pragmatic view regards the context of the explanatory discourse, including the explainer’s cognitive interest and background beliefs, as what determines the appropriate answer. Pragmatists think that the acceptability of the explanatory product is partly a result of the circumstances under which the explanation is produced. Also, they take scientific explanations to be basically similar to explanations in everyday life. The similarity between different kinds of explanations is found in the discourse of questions and answers that takes place in a context consisting of both factual and cognitive elements. The claim is that we do not understand what an explanation is unless we also take more pragmatic aspects around a communicative situation into consideration. The pragmatic view regards explanation as an agent of change in belief systems.
Thus, the pragmatic-rhetorical approach holds that a response to an explanation-seeking question in science need not follow by valid deduction from a set of premises, nor does it need to appeal to a causal mechanism; hence, the acceptance of a response as an explanation includes lots of contextual elements. It does not pretend to give us more than a descriptive account of what the audience will accept as an explanation. Whether an explanation is good or bad, true or false, is not the issue as long as it fits into the general pattern of scientific inquiry. So the insight that can be associated with the pragmatic view of explanation is that scientific inquiry, and thus scientific explanation, is goal-oriented and context-bounded.  It is always performed relative to some set of interests and a set of epistemic norms and standards which are context-dependent. Moreover, those norms and standards often change with change of context without being explicitly acknowledged; thereby leading to controversies about what is an acceptable explanation.
A common objection against any pragmatic theory is that it cannot cope with the widespread wisdom that the understanding one gets from scientific explanations must be objective and invariable. To the extent this intuition is correct, I think the pragmatic approach can account for it. The pragmatist does not have to deny that scientific explanations are concerned with a mind-independent world against which scientific explanations therefore are measured to find out whether they are true or not. She may be a realist of sorts. But in my opinion the common wisdom has limited value. It is based on a flawed metaphysics that there is always one, and only one, correct way of describing the mind-independent world. Our description of the world is dressed in conceptual and theoretical clothing, but the conceptual garb may be renewed from time to time, and norms and standards for evaluating one’s beliefs change with respect to the problem in need of an explanation. Such a change of explanation comes not only with historical development over time but also with the context of the problem. The fact is, I believe, that scientific theories may be empirically underdetermined by evidence, which means that the theory one accepts is determined by other factors than mere observations. These other factors are, however, not equally objective, nor do they have an objective ranking. Here personal or shared interests play an important part.
In my opinion, explanation should be understood in the general context of interpersonal communication. Explanation is closely connected with understanding. When we explain things and events to each other, we pass on information about an immense range of different topics. These may cover such things as the structure of the natural world, social tensions, historical events, reasons for our actions, the meaning of words, symbols, literature and art works, or instructions on how to operate a certain piece of machinery. Explaining things and events is thus an appropriate linguistic reaction to what is considered to be an explanation-seeking question by which we distribute information of all kinds to one another.
Faced with the notions of act and product we must ask ourselves which of them is conceptually prior to the other, or whether they really can be characterised independently of each other. If one is conceptually prior, does it then mean that the secondary sense has to be understood in terms of the primary? A quick glance at the debate shows that most philosophers who defend one of the other approaches, focus entirely on explanation as a product. They never tell us in details how theories, facts, or events possess a capacity of explaining independent of human intentions. What they want is, indeed, to separate objective and subjective features of explanation. They assume that explanation can be completely characterised in terms of formal or ontological categories by abstracting explanation from the pragmatic context in which it takes place. In the right context sentences such as ‘The fact that chlorophyll is green explains why plants are green,’  ‘The decline in interests rates explains the increase in investments,’ and ‘Maxwell’s theory explains that light is electromagnetic radiation’ are indeed completely meaningful. But, I surmise, the use of the term ‘explanation’ is parasitic on the notion of a linguistic discourse that is responsible for binding explanans and explanandum together. The pragmatic theory presupposes that practise is prior to logical status.
Neither facts, nor causes, nor laws explain anything by themselves. There exists no explanatory relationship in nature. Explanation is not an extensional concept, but an intensional one due to the fact that it is meant to confer understanding to the inquirer. Every explanation is therefore sensitive to our way of describing the facts we seek to explain. The relation of explanation is between utterances or statements. However, this does not mean that the explanatory product is objective in another sense. One might think that theories, propositions, or logical arguments exist as abstract structures which make them publicly accessible. But as such they only have virtual existence. The explanatory product is produced with the intention of bringing forth understanding, and therefore its acceptance depends on the explanatory act of fulfilling this intention. Furthermore, we may say that the ontology of explanation is such that the explanatory product has a concrete and temporal existence as part of a communicative activity. Only as part of a discourse can a response to an explanation-seeking question become accessible for evaluation to other people.
Indeed, we do talk about facts explaining facts; however, this is really an elliptical way of expressing that explanations are concerned with facts, and that we want explanations to be true.  We should not blur the distinction between the particular act of explanation and the explanatory force of this action. What counts as an explanation is nevertheless not just a question of facts but as much a question of pragmatic communicative strategies. It is fully acceptable to say that facts explain facts as long as we also recognize that in one discursive context, a certain kind of fact is required to provide the requisite understanding, whereas in a different context, a different kind of fact is called for. In many cases it makes good sense to pay attention to the product of the explaining activity whenever we focus on the different kinds of explanation. But if we want to understand explanation as such, we must acknowledge that the meaning of the explanatory product is partly determined by the context of the explaining act. It is no surprise that the form and the content of explanation offered by different empirical sciences vary according to the subject matter. But subject matter only partly determines the manner in which people explain things; other factors include the context of the audience, and the explanator’s and the explainee’s background knowledge and cognitive and personal interests.

The Standard Wisdom of Interpretation
In recent years there has been a growing philosophical interest in interpretation. But, as the Swedish literary scholar, Torsten Pettersson, has observed, little energy has been spent on the notion of interpretation.​[2]​ I completely agree. Most of the work on interpretation is still done within the narrow perspective of making sense out of meaning. The problem is, however, that interpretation is not only restricted to meaningful phenomena within humanities.
We ask for an explanation with the hope of gaining understanding, and we make interpretations for similar reasons. Moreover, explanation is a linguistic response to a question asking for an explanation, and interpretation is equally a linguistic response to a question that calls for an answer. What, then, separates explanation from interpretation?
It is common wisdom that interpretation is associated with the understanding of meaning. The objects of interpretation are considered to be intentional objects or objects having intentional properties. Therefore, interpretation is seen as a process that leads us to an understanding of persons, actions, or products of these actions, such as linguistic expressions, texts, paintings, sculptures, music, film, dance, plays and social institutions. What we understand is the meaning being expressed by these products and an interpreting activity is what shows the way to this meaning. So an interpretation is a response to a question like “What is the meaning of X?”  An interpretation states or formulates some meaning, significance, character, etc., and often interpretation is characterized in semantic terms. But this view is too narrow and simplistic. 
In one of his many studies of interpretation, Jerrold Levinson (1999:3) characterizes the received wisdom of semantic interpretation in three points:

1)	“Interpretation standardly involves the formation and entertaining of hypotheses, the weighing of possibilities of meaning, significance, role, or function in regard to a given phenomenon or thing.”
2)	“Interpretation standardly involves conscious, deliberate reflection, explicit reasoning, or the like. Not all perception or understanding or apprehension is properly viewed as interpretative, some such is clearly preinterpretative, and serves as that on which interpretation rests, or that from which it departs.”
3)	“Interpretation standardly presupposes the nonobviousness of what is being interpreted; if one simply and securely sees that X is F, if there is no question of choosing or deciding to do so, then remarking that X is F is not a matter of interpreting it.”

The received wisdom has been called into question by so-called post-modern philosophers who argue that every belief, idea, or opinion is acquired in virtue of an interpretation. There is, however, very little that supports such an extreme view.​[3]​
Levinson is no post-modern philosopher. He more or less accepts “these three features as definitive of any activity worth labelling interpretative.” I very much agree. The Swedish aesthetician Göran Harmerén (1992:136) summarizes very clearly the reasons for accepting the standard wisdom in the following sentences. “There is, I suppose, a sliding scale between ‘recognizing x as x’ and ‘interpreting x as y’. When we encounter a smiling face, we do not see it as a configuration of lines and shapes and then interpret it as a smiling face; we recognize immediately the smiling face as a smiling face. But when we look at the gestures in paintings, interpretation may sometimes be necessary. There would be no point in interpreting something unless the object of interpretation was unclear or bewildering in some way …”  One may add that recognition is conceptually mediated, of course, but that ‘immediately’ means something like ‘non-inferentially;’ i.e., the belief one acquires of a smiling face is not inferred from any further belief.
The first feature, mentioned by Levinson, is that interpretation consists of ‘formation and entertaining of hypotheses’. If we include the hypothetical character as a necessary feature of interpretation, we may define interpretation as

(I)	The connection between X and Y constitutes an interpretation XE "interpretation"  for some person P, if and only if (i) P believes that X represents Y because X is in some manner attached to Y, and (ii) P’s belief as expressed in (i) is presented as the result of a hypothesis.​[4]​

How X is attached to Y is determined by the kind of objects being interpreted. If X and Y stand for physical phenomena it may be a case of cause XE "cause: see also causal laws and explanation"  and effect, but if they stand for items relating to human thought and agency, the connection may be intentional or conventional. Thus, there are two kinds of “representing”: causal, as when effects “represent” their causes and therefore act as the evidence for holding certain causes occurred, and non-causal, intentional, or conventional as in what a work of art “represents”.
Levinson believes that interpretation is concerned with meaning, significance, purpose, or role which he associates with semantic issues in a broad sense. For instance, he assumes that interpreting whether or not a rock is a meteorite, an unexpected natural event, readings or measurements are all examples of semantic interpreting, admitting that ‘semantic’ should be understood broadly. As far as interpreting aims at finding out which conceptual category covers a particular specimen or a natural event, it is certainly justified to call it “semantic.” I think, however, that there are other forms of interpretation that depend on the kind of object under consideration and the epistemic character of one’s representational problem.  Hence, I suggest a distinction between proper semantic interpretation as an activity directed towards linguistic or symbolic meaning from other kinds of interpretation such as causal, structural, functional or intentional interpretation.
The third feature of those mentioned above indicates that we make use of an interpreting activity in case we are facing something which we cannot immediately recognize or understand. But, then, how do we differentiate between explanation and interpretation?  If both supply the explainee and interpretee with understanding, an obvious answer seems to be that explanation provides understanding in virtue of causation whereas interpretation is occupied with understanding in virtue of meaning. ​[5]​

The Hermeneutic Tradition
In the hermeneutic tradition going back to Wilhelm Dilthey, it is part of a general understanding of science and humanities that the notions of explanation and interpretation are kept strictly apart. Science, he famously said, explains the natural world, whereas humanities understand human life.​[6]​ This demarcation may also add to the explanation of why so much ink has been spilled on the meaning of explanation, but only little on interpretation in comparison. Dilthey basically thought that nature is alienated. It is external to us and given to us only piece by piece via sense experience, while the spiritual life is internal to us and is given in its full continuity. The spiritual lies open to us and can therefore be understood in its particularity. In contrast, science must postulate structures behind observable phenomena together with observable phenomena to be able to bring the latter into a necessary connectedness. Also Dilthey believed that we can only know of other people through a comparison with ourselves. He argued that all understanding in the humanities consists in a reconstruction of another person’s mental life based on a perceptible particular like an action, a document, an artwork, or a literary text. The method, by which this is done, Dilthey held, is hermeneutics in the Schleiermacher’s tradition. So classical hermeneutics associated understanding with meaning and saw interpretation as the method to acquire such an understanding.




We do talk about interpretation in the natural sciences. Think of interpretation of visual phenomena, experiments, measuring effects, data, formalisms, mathematical models and theories. Interpretation takes place in cases where we want to understand what is going on in astronomy, physics, chemistry, and biology. If this is true, then the objects of interpretation need not be intentional objects.  Interpretation is not merely oriented towards objects that carry linguistic or symbolic meaning like languages, actions, and social institutions, but just as well towards the unanimated and meaningless nature. Interpretation should not be characterized as a cognitive activity which involves understanding meaningful object. Being a cognitive activity it should be characterized with respect to what it does with the interpreter.  The functional role of interpretation is to make a conventional sign or a natural phenomenon meaningful for the interpreter; that is its role is to provide him or her with a further understanding of the object in question.
In science what makes a phenomenon meaningful is our ability to place that phenomenon into a causal story or to subsume it under a general law. Looking for applications of the notion of natural law or the notion of causation seems to be the way we attempt to understand things in science. As in other areas, the state of understanding is reached when a badly understood phenomenon is connected with some other phenomenon according to our background assumptions. So a question like “What does X mean?” may in the right context be equivalent to posing the question “What causes X?” or “What is X evidence of?” 
So whereas the objects of interpretation may differ, it also seems to be the case, regardless of the nature of the object under investigation, that the cognitive act of interpreting within science and humanities have something in common. What turns a question into one about interpretation is not the kind of object that is subject of the question but the kind of epistemic context in which this question appears. Such an interpretation-seeking question arises, so it seems, in an epistemic context in which the interpreter faces a representational problem.
A person may be presented with an interpretation by another person as an appropriate reply to her interpretation-seeking question. But if nobody (to her knowledge) is able to answer her, she has to respond herself. Whenever a person comes up with a hypothetical answer as a reply to questions like “What does X mean?” etc., she is involved in an act of interpretation. We are engaged in an interpretive process in situations where we try to understand (or improve our understanding of) a particular phenomenon – whether it is verbal meaning, visual signs or unknown or unexpected natural events – and whenever we can get no help from other people who may understand what we actually don’t understand.  More generally we are all involved in interpretation if the truth of an answer is underdetermined with respect to the phenomenon we want to know something about. We interpret by asking interpretation-seeking questions and then go on by answering them in terms of positing a hypothesis. In situations, which produce an underdetermined answer, a more provisional hypothesis is formed. As a consequence many explanations, which go beyond the immediate experience, start out as interpretations and may continue to be interpretations. This makes the concept of interpretation, like that of explanation, complex and diverse. 
Strangely enough, philosophers of science who have been occupied with explanation have paid little interest in characterizing interpretation in spite of the fact that they themselves speak of interpretation.​[8]​ This lack of interest is partly due to the fact, I think, that they intuitively assume that these two concepts belong to each side of Reichenbach’s famous distinction between the context of discovery and the context of justification. Thus, interpretation has to do with the context of discovery, whereas explanation belongs to the context of justification. This led philosophers like Karl Popper and Carl Hempel to develop the deductive-nomological model of explanation and to ignore the interpretational origin of explanation. They simply didn’t take the notion of interpretation serious because they considered it to be too psychological with its close ties to meaning and understanding; tacitly, they seem to have accepted the hermeneutic division between explanation and understanding as important for a characterization of the difference between the natural sciences and the humanities (Geisteswissenschaften). In contrast, hermeneutic philosophers have dealt with understanding and interpretation, but paid no attention to explanation. An important consequence is that the rigorousness of the various accounts of explanation is missing with respect to the accounts of interpretation. Explanation was the object of a logical analysis, interpretation involved a psychological specification.

Two Forms of Interpretation
But there is more to interpretation than the fact that the natural sciences also make use of it. There is a general ambiguity in the way we think of interpretation which seems to have gone unnoticed. Sometimes the object of an interpretation is what is considered to represent something such as signs, symbols, and symptoms. The interpretation-seeking question is then a question such as “What does X mean?”, “What does X stand for?”, “What does X refer to?”, “What is X a sign of?”, “What is X evidence for?”, “What kind of role does X have?”, or “What causes X?” Call a response to any of these questions, for the lack of anything better, determinative interpretation.​[9]​ 
In science these kinds of questions are posed in connection with data, observation, mathematical models, and theories. The industry around concocting interpretations of quantum mechanics reveals better than anything that determinative interpretation in science takes place on the scale of metaphysics. But the separation of mathematical models and physical reality is also a place for determinative interpretation. This is so because there is no blank inference from a statement that X is mathematically well-defined or X figures in a mathematical structure to a claim that X has physical meaning, or X is physically real. A mathematical model may have a surplus structure which has no real counterpart. Take, for instance, the existence of advanced solutions to the Maxwell equations or the negative energy solutions of the relativistic four-momentum vector. From these solutions we cannot automatically deduce the existence of backward causation of some sort.
 Finally, on the level of discovery of new data or measurement results, a great amount of determinative interpretation is present all the time. For instance, the observation of type 1a supernovas by Perlmutter et al. and Smith et al. in the last 7 years has shown that the light is dimmer when comparing light curves with redshifts than would be expected if the Universe were expanding or slowing down at a constant rate. This observation is then interpreted as a sign that the expansion of the Universe is increasing, but also the experimental data, which define the actual light curve and redshift, are constructed based on determinative interpretations.​[10]​
Sometimes, however, interpretation cannot be considered a cognitive response to a question like “What does X mean?” or other similar questions. In these cases the object of interpretation is a particular phenomenon or type of phenomenon Y that lacks a proper conceptual or mathematical representation. Facing this kind of epistemic problem the interpretative questions are “What is Y?”, “How can Y be represented?”, “How can Y be understood?”, or “How can Y be structured?” We may call a proper response to any of these questions investigative interpretation. Clearly, there is a difference here between the two types of interpretation. An important one, I should say. The distinction is between whether or not it is the representation or the would-be represented that is the object of one’s curiosity and attempts of understanding. 
 A determinative interpretation suggesting whether or not X represents Y is somehow related to explanations, whereas an investigative interpretation telling us how Y may be represented can be seen as a conceptual or theoretical presentation of Y which may then be used for explanatory purposes.   Determinative interpretations act as tentative explanations. To every kind of interpretation corresponds a similar kind of explanation.   An answer to an explanation-seeking question functions as an interpretation only as long as there is no consensus about the correctness of the answer. It is the degree of certainty being associated with the response which determines whether it should be considered as an interpretation or an explanation. 
In the constellation Norma, 10,000 light years away, astronomers recently discovered a strange object in the centre of a supernova remnant.​[11]​ At first sight it looks like a neutron star. It is estimated to be about 20 km across like other neutron stars.  But a closer study shows that its X-ray outburst is tens of thousands of times longer than expected from newly created neutron stars. And 1E161348-5055, as the object is called, is still young, approximately 2,000 years. So we have a situation which calls for interpretation: What does this mean? In the actual context this question is identical to “What causes the abnormal behaviour of 1E?” One answer is that the object is a magnetar, i.e. an unusual subclass of neutrons that is highly magnetized. However, these spin several times faster than this object. The suggestion is then that the object is surrounded by a debris disk slowing down the rotation of the star. Nothing like this has ever been observed before. Another answer might be that 1E is a part of a binary system where the other half is a low mass object smaller than our sun. Similar systems are known but in general they are millions of times older. Thus, scientists do not yet know how to explain the unusual behaviour of this, object and until one of these speculations is confirmed, they all count as possible interpretations of data.
On the other hand, every proposal of classifying and representing an object or a class of objects, a structure or a class of structures, a relation or a class of relations in a non-obvious and unexpected way is an example of investigative interpretation. Famous examples are Copernicus’ heliocentric model, Newton’s three laws, Bohr’s semi-classical model of the atom, or Einstein’s field equations around the time when these constructions were presented to the scientific world. It was not until later that these conceptual constructions lost their hypothetical and tentative character and gained their emblematic nature. This happened at the very moment the scientific community accepted them, at least for a while, as being empirically successful and therefore correctly representing the observable fact.
 The above example of 1E161348-5055 is not a case of investigative interpretation. Based on models of star evolutions and the data of observation, astronomers still believe that the object left behind is a neutron star. It is only the X-ray outburst data that does not fit neutron stars seen so far. The astronomers do not even question what these data are evidence of. They merely want to know what causes them to stand out from similar data from other neutron stars.
Whether or not one wants to consider investigative interpretation as another form of tentative explanation depends on the view one holds with respect to classification and scientific theories. A realist concerning natural kinds and theories would indeed argue that this kind of interpretation is explanatory because classification and theories are literally true. But a more pragmatic view on natural kinds and theories may take them to be vocabularies or conceptual tools for the construction of models which then can be used to give explanation. One may say at least that investigative interpretations are necessary presuppositions for generating future explanations.

Interpretation and what-questions
Often explanations are associated with responses to why-questions. So a possible way of trying to separate explanation from interpretation would be to suggest that an explanation-seeking question is a why-question whereas an interpretation-seeking question is a what-question. The idea is that we ask what-questions as long as we have very little or no knowledge of the subject being asked about. But as soon as we acquire more information about the subject we begin to formulate how-questions and finally we pose why-questions to get the ultimate information. A typical example would be one in which we start out with “What is it?” Depending on the context that gives rise to the question, the requested information seems to require either a determinative or an investigative interpretation. 
Assume you are looking at a bright white spot on a starry sky. You know, as part of your background knowledge, that what you see is not a planet or a comet, but a hitherto unobserved big and bright star. This was also Tycho’s conclusion after he had argued, based on observation of no parallax, that the very bright spot he saw in the constellation Cassiopeia didn’t belong to the spheres of the planets.   The question “What is it?” then became equivalent to a question like “What does an unexpectedly appearing star mean?” The interpreting answer might then be “It’s a newborn star.” Tycho, believing that the star he saw shining bright in the sky year 1572 was a new star, was in fact wrong in his interpretation of the phenomenon. But not until last century did astronomers realize that the phenomenon witnessed by Tycho was a star dying of age. It was a supernova.  Baade and Zwicky (1934a) were the first to interpret observational data of suddenly very bright objects by separating common novas from supernovas in terms of their brightness. Furthermore, based on the luminosity of observed supernovas and by using Einstein’s mass-energy equation they calculated the amount of mass being dispersed into space. Their conclusion was “that the phenomenon of a super-nova represents the transition of an ordinary star into a body of considerably smaller mass.” (p.258) But they did not account for the nature of this object. 
In the consecutive paper published in the same issue, Baade and Zwicky (1934b) proposed that the object might be a neutron star. “With all reserve we advance the view that a super-nova represents the transition of an ordinary star into a neutron star, consisting mainly of neutrons.” (p. 263). This suggestion was made just a year after James Chadwick discovered the neutron. Thus, you may say that their supernova hypothesis was an example of a determinative interpretation, whereas the neutron star hypothesis may count as an example of an investigative interpretation. It was mainly due to theoretical reasons that they identified the leftover of a supernova explosion as a neutron star because such a star might “posses a very small radius and an extremely high density.” This, they noticed, is a result of the fact that neutrons can be packed much more closely than electrons and nuclei.
The next question might then be something like “How does a supernova develop?” A qualified response to this question would, assuming that light coming from a supernova contains information about this process, require an answer to the following question: “How does the light of a supernova vary over time?” Baade and Zwicky were not able to answer any of these questions in 1934. As they stated: “A more detailed discussion of the super-nova process must be postponed until accurate light-curves and high-dispersion spectra are available.
Unfortunately, at the present time only a few underexposed spectra of super-novae are available, and it has not thus far been possible to interpret them.” (p. 259) One answer came in 1941 when Rudolph Minkowski suggested that supernova could be divided into type I and type II according to their different spectra and different light-curves. 
 The same year, an answer to the question “How does a supernova take place?” appeared. The idea was that a star becomes a supernova through an explosion and a mechanics was suggested for how such an explosion was possible. It was only thereafter that astronomers had reached a level of understanding where the stadium of explanation could be introduced. Astronomers could now hope to answer a question like “Why does a supernova explosion happen?” However, it was not until 1960, after the standard theory of stellar nucleosynthesis had come to light, that Fred Hoyle and William Fowler were able to set up a quantitative theory of supernovas. According to this theory, the explosion of type I supernovas is caused by the “ignition” of heaver nucleons, especially carbon, in the centre of the stars; whereas type II is generated by an implosion of non-degenerated matter to a neutron star in the core of very heavy stars. A reasonable theory of supernovas was available around 1970, although a revised and even better understanding arose around 1990.  This was a result of the fact that the astronomers became aware of the explanatory advantage it had to make a finer distinction among supernovas (type Ia, Ib, Ic, IIP and IIL) and to combine nuclear physics with hydrodynamical models (describing chock waves.)
Unfortunately, the proposed distinction between explanation and interpretation does not work. There are three reasons for this: 1) we can rephrase some what-questions as why-questions, and vice versa. For instance, “What makes X happen?” is semantically equivalent with “Why does X happen?” The questioner may therefore posses as little or as much information about X when he or she puts forward a why-question or a what-question.  2) Likewise, some what-questions can be translated into how-questions, and vice versa.  The question “What is the relationship between X and Y?” has the same semantic content as “How does X relate to Y?” 3) It is not every what-question that invites an interpretation. Take examples like “What time is it?” and “What is an electron?” Similarly, not all why-questions are requests for explanation. It depends on the actual context whether or not they are. 4) Finally, everyone will probably agree that a response to a question such as “Who is the murder?” “When was the victim killed?” or “Where did the killing take place?” may be classified as an interpretation given the epistemic uncertainty by which the answer is produced. But it also seems to be the case that some questions formulated as why-questions or how-questions may only be addressed tentatively and answered with a great amount of doubt. Any such question addressed in terms of a hypothesis that is not testable, or even not tested, can rightly be called an interpretative inquiry. For instance, nobody knows why the universe began expanding around 14 billion years ago, and any proposal based on theoretical and experimental information has the character of an interpretation.

Interpretation as a response to a representational question
Determinative interpretation is, I shall suggest, a tentative explanation that intends to solve a cognitive problem concerning understanding a representational issue. The distinction between explanation and interpretation has more to do with pragmatics than semantics. It is the epistemic context in which the question is posed that determines whether the question is explanation-seeking or interpretation-seeking. The person raising the question may not even know what  kind of question it is. In everyday situations both the questioner and the respondent will, of course, frequently know that there is a definite answer which does not have any hypothetical form. Take a question like “What got you into trouble?” In these circumstances the question is indeed explanation-seeking. The person being addressed by this question normally knows the answer. This is different from a question such as “Why do you think he got into trouble?” Here we face two possibilities: 1) neither the questioner nor the respondent knows why. Thus the questioner poses an interpretation-seeking question, and the answer given by the respondent is a statement of interpretation. 2) Another possibility is that the questioner does not know the answer, neither does he expect the interlocutor to know, but she turns out to be well informed as to the reasons. In this case it seems right to say that the question is intended as an interpretation-seeking question but the answer is more than a tentative explanation.
In science the circumstances under which scientists explain or interpret do not change. The major difference is that scientists are much more aware of the fact whether or not they enquire for an explanation or an interpretation. If a student asks his physics professor about what causes the certain peak on a graph, he expects the professor to know the answer according to his professional insight and experience. But if the professor as a researcher believes that no such agreement exists, she may come forward with an interpretation of this particular phenomenon which is either due to other researchers or made up by herself. 
The determinative interpretation is a result of a cognitive activity by which one tentatively explains the evidential or representational role of some given phenomenon. Inquiries about the evidential or representational role appear in connection with the consideration of natural effects, data, measurements, objects, signs, symbols, texts, or actions where the inquirer does have an epistemic problem of not understanding the evidential or representative task of what she is seeing, hearing, reading, observing, etc. A determinative interpretation arises in contexts where a phenomenon is considered to represent something else, say a peak on a graph, but where there are doubts about what the phenomenon is a sign of. 
Similarly, we can say that an investigative interpretation takes place whenever the inquirer has an epistemic problem of not understanding what she is seeing, hearing, reading, observing, etc. She then attempts to solve her cognitive disability by looking for a possible candidate of an appropriate conceptual classification or theoretical representation. Such a cognitive description may then be used with the purpose of explanation.
Thus, we ask for a tentative explanation whenever we believe that we do not possess the right and/or necessary information to solve a representational problem but believe that we, or somebody else, may have the capacity to provide us with a suggestive clue. An appropriate response is generated by the interpreter based upon a certain understanding of the cognitive problem raised by the interpretation-seeking question. As we have seen from the supernova examples, what are considered relevant interpretations are constrained by our background assumptions. Tycho assumed that a bright object in the sky belonged to the stellar sphere in case it didn’t show any parallax, an assumption that has never been put into doubt. Similarly, Baade and Zwicky presupposed that Einstein’s mass-energy formula is correct and that Chadwick had discovered electrically neutral particles with no electrostatic forces between them and therefore densely packable. The relevant hypothesis in Tycho’s understanding was that the sudden appearance of a star presented a birth whereas in the Baade and Zwicky’s understanding, the same phenomenon pointed to a supernova, i.e. a star dying of age in transition from the stage of an ordinary star to the stage of a neutron star.​[12]​ 
So if no acceptable explanation of a certain phenomenon is available, we must ask the right interpretation-seeking questions and answer them by proposing a relevant hypothesis that can be used for explanation. Promoting a particular answer is exactly what interpretation is. In situations where we understand things straight away, where we have knowledge of the facts involved and of the representational conventions, no interpretation is needed, and any response to a representational question, which relies on these facts and conventions, does not involve an interpretation.
A pragmatic notion of interpretation sees it as a context-dependent response to an interpretation-seeking question, and because the role of interpretation is more or less the same as the role of explanation we may apply the pragmatic-rhetorical theory of explanation to interpretation as well. According to this approach, an interpretation is a deliberately produced answer to an interpretation-seeking question. The way the interpretation turns out depends in part on the process and therefore, among other things, on the aim and cognitive interest of those who do the interpretive work. My claim is that the type of interpretation is determined partly by the interpreter and partly by the object of the interpretation.
Indeed, the object plays an important role in the interpreter’s selection of the relevant type of interpretation. The interpreter constrains her interpretation in accordance with her grasp of the object by choosing the type of interpretation accordingly. A natural phenomenon will give rise to a different kind of interpretation than a text or a painting.  But the interpreter’s knowledge of the situation, her goals and interests are also elements in determining the form of interpretation. Thus the person’s background assumptions and his pre-understanding of the object influence the hypothesis she generates. This applies not only to the form of hypothesis, but to the content as well. The content of an interpretation is as much context-dependent as its form. But, again, the object of interpretation imposes some constraints on any possible understanding of the content.

Conclusion
Let us summarize the main view forwarded here. Explanation is an answer to an explanation-seeking question in a context in which some person lacks some information about a certain fact (or phenomenon). Humans have epistemic interests in understanding things according to their nature, and explanations are what give us understanding of the questions which are raised as a consequence of these epistemic interests. The response to such questions is an explanation. Whenever we possess an explanation, we also have an understanding of the question which has been answered by the explanation.  But our background assumptions determine what the relevant answer to our questions is. Explanations take part of a bigger system of beliefs.
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^1	  A further presentation, see Faye (1999), (2002) Ch. 3, and (2007)
^2	  T. Pettersson (2003), p. 30. After having mentioned all kinds of works on interpretation he states: “But whatever their focus, insights, or differences, these discussions and numerous others have one thing in common: they fail to define their subject. Apparently the concept of interpretation is so ingrained in our culture that even scholars who devote considerable energy to a scrutiny of some of its aspects see no need to define or delimit the concept itself beyond a few simple assumptions.”
^3	  See Faye (2003) for a discussion of postmodernism in relation to the humanities.
^4	  See Faye (2002), p.
^5	  I use the word ‘interpretee’ for the recipient of an interpretation in the same way as an awardee is the recipient of an award.  
^6	  Dilthey (1894), s. 144.
^7	  H.-G. Gadamer (1960/1993)
^8	  An exception is Bas van Fraassen and Jill Sigman (1993) in which they write about interpretation in the natural sciences and the arts. But van Fraassen does not attempt to relate their discussion of interpretation to his pragmatic theory of explanation. 
^9	  Levinson isolates two notions of interpretation which he calls the ‘determinative mode of interpretation’ and the ‘exploratory modes of interpretation’. The first is concerned with the question “What does it means”; the second is dealing with “What could it mean?" Even though the first notion is similar to the one suggested here, the second is not.
^10	  See Saul Perlmutter’s review article (2003), in which he talks about “Such a supernova CAT-scan is difficult to interpret” p.53. A supernova CAT-scan is the measurement of the atmosphere of the exploding type 1a supernova. When the outer layer of atmosphere is thinning it allows us to observe the inner layers and the changing luminosity of the energy spectrum. 
^11	  De Luca et al. (2006)
^12	  The relevance of the hypothesis that counts as an interpreting response is determined by ontological, semantic, epistemic, and methodological values. See Faye (2002) p. 
